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1. Introduction 
Over the last twenty years the four poorest states in the EU 15 have experienced very 
significant benefits as a consequence of their membership of the EU. Ireland became a 
member of the then EEC as early as 1973, whereas Greece became a member in 1980 and 
Spain and Portugal in the middle of the 1980s. These four “cohesion” states have pursued 
rather different policies over the past twenty years and have undergone rather different 
experiences of integration into the EU economy. For three of the four countries the last twenty 
years have seen a significant convergence in living standards towards the EU average. For 
Ireland the period of convergence in the 1990s was quite dramatic in terms of its speed. 
However, the progress in Spain and Portugal was also notable over the same period. It is only 
in the case of Greece that the progress has been less marked over the same period. 
These differing experiences of integration into the EU economy carry some lessons. It is clear 
from the sheer diversity of the policies pursued and the differing pace of adjustment that there 
is not a single “model” of convergence. There are many different possible paths for states to 
promote economic development and no single strategy dominates the other possible 
strategies. Nonetheless, out of this diversity there are a number of common themes which may 
prove useful to the ten new member states, which are already well down the path to 
integration into the wider EU economy. 
Economic development is a long-term process – there is no simple instrument that can 
painlessly transform an economy overnight. Much public discourse ignores this fact, seeking 
immediate solutions to what is inevitably a long-term problem of underdevelopment. 
Research into the process of catching up (economic convergence) must take this into account. 
It makes the identification of the role of the different economic processes in promoting 
convergence no simple task. However, it is clear from the huge experience built up over the 
last half century that certain key elements are essential economic prosperity: free trade and an 
open and competitive economy, investment in human capital, and adequate infrastructure.  
Free trade is sometimes sold as a simple and speedy medicine that will rapidly transform an 
economy from poverty to wealth. In fact it is a far from simple process, operating through 
many different channels simultaneously. Even if the process of adjustment to free trade is 
properly managed it will take some considerable time to produce its full benefits. The process 
of adjustment from a regime of autarchy to a regime of free trade will also involve 
considerable adjustment costs. However, the experience of the existing four cohesion 
countries, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain, suggests that even during the adjustment to 
free trade, the costs are offset by benefits, and the long-term effects are hugely beneficial.  
Membership of the European Union is more than just membership of a free trade zone. It 
enshrines the free movement of labour and capital as well as goods. The completion of the 
internal market in 1992 completed this process of integration for the existing EU members. 
The success of the Single Market programme has been very important, not just for the richer 
members of the EU, but also for the existing four cohesion countries. While the manifesto of 
the Single Market, the Cecchini report (1988), raised the possibility that some of the more 
peripheral countries might lose out as a result of the completion of the market, the opposite 
has proved to be the case. As is discussed below, the 1990s saw considerable success in the 
process of convergence, as the cohesion countries narrowed the gap in living standards 
between them and the richer members of the EU.  
The Structural Funds support for the cohesion countries was increased in the late 1980s in 
anticipation that these countries would face problems of adjustment. While this additional 
support contributed to the process of convergence, it is clear that market forces played a much 
more important role in promoting cohesion within the wider EU. It is also clear that the 
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completion of the internal market was generally good for promoting convergence rather than 
the reverse (ESRI, 1997). It is the strength of the market forces promoting cohesion among 
the fifteen “old” members which is the key message for the “new” members who joined on 
the first of May 2004.  
For the new members, the way forward was clear from the fall of the iron curtain. The process 
of adjustment to free trade and preparation for EU membership began immediately on the 
change of political regime. All these countries have undergone a very painful process of 
adjustment, with much of the existing business base closing and gradually being replaced by 
new businesses. There have been considerable social costs to this adjustment, with continuing 
high levels of unemployment in many of these countries. However, the experience of the 
existing cohesion countries, Ireland, Spain, Portugal and Greece, indicates that such a painful 
process will be rewarded by more rapid growth within an enlarged EU market.  
While the four existing cohesion countries had an easier transition to full EU membership 
than has been the case for those who joined earlier this year, it was by no means easy. Many 
of the same problems, of industrial decline and social dislocation, have been experienced in 
the process of convergence, albeit on a somewhat smaller scale. The reassuring feature of this 
story is that the strength of the forces driving convergence has been sufficient to overcome the 
many policy mistakes that have been made along the way in the four cohesion countries. 
This paper considers some of the lessons that can be learned from the experience of the 
existing cohesion countries – how to do it better. The paper first considers the record on 
convergence and the role of the single market and the domestic policy environment in 
bringing it about. It then considers the significance in this process of convergence of flexible 
labour markets, of investment in human capital, and investment in infrastructure. 
2. The record 
The process of convergence has not been straightforward, with each of the four countries 
pursuing rather different paths. Taking output per capita, adjusted for PPS, as the measure of 
convergence, Figure 1 shows the contrasting paths of the four cohesion countries over the last 
20 years.  
Figure 1: GDP per head, adjusted for PPS, relative to EU average 
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In the case of Ireland there was little change over the period 1960 to 1990. However, over the 
course of the 1990s Irish GDP per head moved from about 60% of the EU average in 1990 to 
over 120% of the EU average today. In terms of GNP per head, a more appropriate measure 
of standard of living for Ireland, the Irish position today is just over 100% of the EU average, 
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still a notable rate of convergence over a short period of time.1 A number of studies have 
argued that the exceptionally rapid Irish convergence to the EU average should be seen as a 
belated convergence, one that would have occurred more gradually over the previous twenty 
years if more appropriate domestic policies had been pursued (Fitz Gerald, 2000 and Honohan 
and Walsh, 2003). 
In the case of Spain there has also been notable progress, moving from a GDP per head of 
70% of the EU average at the time of accession to the EU in the mid-1980s to around 85% 
today. Beginning from a lower base at the time of EU membership, at 53% of the EU average, 
Portugal has moved to around 68% of the EU average to date, a rather similar speed of 
convergence to that of Spain. Greece is the exception among the four cohesion countries with 
a GDP per head of around 70% of the EU average, roughly the position it was in at the time of 
membership in 1980. 
To better understand the factors driving convergence it is useful to decompose the change in 
living standards into a number of components, as shown in Figure 2. Probably the key factor 
in the long-term convergence process is the growth in productivity. The growth in 
productivity can be affected by supply side policies in a number of different ways. However, 
public policy and the effects of EU integration can also affect the employment rate (the 
inverse of the unemployment rate) and the participation rate. While also affected by policy in 
the very long-term, the age dependency ratio was largely predetermined within the period of 
EU integration considered here: the effects of the fall in the birth rate in earlier decades takes 
some considerable time to affect this ratio. 
Figure 2: Decomposition of Measure of GDP per head 
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Figure 3 shows a decomposition of the growth in GDP per capita over the period 1980-2000 
for the four cohesion countries. For comparative purposes a similar decomposition is shown 
for the EU as a whole and also for the US for the same period. (For Ireland the decomposition 
is made in terms of GNP/head, a better measure of standard of living than GDP/head.) 
This Figure shows that an important factor in the convergence of Portugal and Ireland was 
that the growth in productivity was significantly greater than the EU average (or than in the 
US). For Spain the rate of growth of productivity was also slightly greater than for the EU as 
a whole. In the case of Greece the growth in productivity was notably slower than for the rest 
of the EU. It is this more rapid growth in productivity in Ireland and Portugal that is likely to 
be crucial for the accession countries if they are to show a rapid convergence to the EU 
average over the coming decade. In subsequent sections, this paper concentrates on the factors 
affecting the growth in productivity and on how public policy can accelerate the growth in 
this vital factor. 
The rise in the participation rate was fairly general across the four cohesion countries and was 
broadly in line with the experience of the rest of the EU and of the US over the same period. 
The biggest contribution of rising participation rates to growth in GDP per head was that in 
Spain of 0.7% a year compared to an EU average of 0.6% a year and 0.3% a year for Portugal. 
                                                     
1 GNP excludes profit repatriations by foreign multinationals, which represent a significant share of 
GDP in Ireland. These repatriations are not available as income for Irish residents and do not contribute 
directly to enhancing the standard of living. 
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Figure 3: Decomposition of Growth in GDP per capita, 1980-2000 
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The other major factor contributing to convergence was the growth in GDP per head arising 
from the fall in the rate of age dependency. This reflects the fact that the birth rate fell rather 
later in the four cohesion countries than in the EU as a whole. In Ireland the fall in the birth 
rate, which began in 1980, was compounded by the effects of past emigration. The very high 
rate of emigration in the 1930s, 1940s and the 1950s has the effect of reducing the numbers 
aged over 65 in the population today.  
This benefit from the fall in age-dependency is an exceptional factor, which will be reversed 
in the very long run. It is also unlikely to be relevant for most of the accession countries, 
which have a demographic profile closer to that of the richer members of the EU 15, who are 
now suffering from the problems associated with rising age dependency. 
3. EU integration, the Single Market and a Competitive Economy 
The single most important factor in promoting convergence between the four existing 
cohesion countries and the rest of the existing EU has been free trade. For much of Western 
Europe the period after the Second World War saw an immediate recognition of the 
importance of free trade in promoting growth. The foundation of the EEC in 1956 was the 
most obvious manifestation of this policy. However, it was also central to the economic 
policies of the bulk of the non-EEC members in Western Europe and to the United States. The 
foundation of EFTA further strengthened this commitment to free trade.  
The fruits of the commitment to free trade can be seen in the rapid growth of most of the 
economies in Western Europe. The exceptions to this widespread adoption of a policy of 
openness and free trade were the four existing cohesion countries, which together lagged 
behind the rapid progress in the rest of Western Europe. 
In the case of Ireland the rapid growth of the 1990s is often portrayed as a success story that 
could be repeated in other countries. However, it is better understood as belated progress, 
progress that would almost certainly have occurred much earlier if Ireland had pursued a more 
enlightened policy in the years immediately following the Second World War. Unlike much 
of the rest of Western Europe Ireland continued to pursue a policy of self-development, closed 
to the outside world, for much of the 1950s. It was only towards the end of that decade that it 
began to dawn on Irish policy-makers that they had “missed the boat” of free trade.  
In the case of Spain and Portugal the obstacles to free trade were compounded by the 
undemocratic nature of the political regimes, which continued until the 1970s. The problems 
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of Greece were also compounded by the political difficulties of the country in the late 1960s 
and the 1970s. 
While economic theory has long taught the central importance of free trade, it does not mean 
that adjusting to such a regime is an easy process. In the case of Ireland, because the process 
was long drawn out the costs and benefits of the change in regime are difficult to disentangle 
from the policy mistakes that overlay the process. These issues are discussed in detail in Fitz 
Gerald, 2000, and Honohan and Walsh, 2003. These included the continuation of a policy of 
economic autarchy through the 1950s; a failure to invest in human capital when the rest of 
Northern Europe from the Urals in Russia  to Snowdonia in the United Kingdom realised its 
importance; and the serious mistakes in fiscal policy in the late 1970s and the early 1980s. 
Without these mistakes the process of economic convergence would almost certainly have 
occurred much sooner in Ireland. 
The pubic finance crisis of Ireland in the 1980s was a self-inflicted wound. The serious delays 
in undertaking the necessary adjustment in the early years of the 1980s compounded these 
problems. By reducing the resources available for investment in human capital and 
infrastructure the crisis had a serious medium-term impact on the economy’s potential growth 
rate. In addition, in the early years of adjustment the focus was more on raising taxation than 
on cutting current expenditure. As Alesina and Perotti, 1995, indicate, fiscal adjustments are 
more successful when they rely on cutting current expenditure. The Finnish experience of the 
early 1990s shows that a short sharp adjustment process, while painful, can minimise the 
long-term damage to an economy. 
A second aspect of the experience of the four cohesion countries relevant to the new members 
of the EU is the importance of embracing the opportunities that EU membership offers, rather 
than fighting a rearguard action to preserve businesses and sectors that are in decline. Letting 
firms die through the operation of market forces is very painful socially and politically. 
However, the desperate fiscal position faced by many of the accession states in the early years 
of the 1990s left them with little choice but to pursue such a policy. A fiscal crisis in Ireland 
in the early 1980s also forced the abolition of the agency that was targeted at supporting 
domestic firms facing major difficulties from the transition process. At the time it was painful 
but it helped to force a change in the focus of economic policy directed at sectors of the 
economy likely to grow in the future. Indirectly this involved seeking to promote business 
that provided skilled jobs, likely to be competitive in the long term, rather than attracting low-
skilled employment, which was likely to have a shorter “shelf life”. 
A key positive factor in promoting the transformation of the economies of some of the 
existing cohesion countries has been the process of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). In 
Ireland it played a central role in policy over the last forty years. It was adopted at the 
beginning of the process of opening the economy to free trade in the late 1950s, and it has 
been pursued with consistency by all governments since then. The importance of the 
consistency with which this policy was pursued in establishing credibility with potential 
investors has been emphasised by Ruane and Görg, 1997. Multinational investors are cautious 
and they require proof that the legal, regulatory and tax framework in the countries where 
they are considering investing is stable and is unlikely to change in an unfavourable way. 
Establishing such a track record takes time and many accession countries have not yet seen 
the full benefits of the reforms undertaken over the last decade in the form of increased 
investment.  
The most important factor in attracting foreign direct investment has been the guarantee of 
ready access to the huge EU market. Once it became clear that Spain would definitely join the 
EU it began to see a significant flow of foreign investment. So too, once it became certain that 
countries such as Hungary and Poland would join the EU investors were reassured and moved 
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accordingly. Thus the 1st of May 2004 was not the key date for foreign investors; they were 
already treating the accession countries as EU members in making their investment decisions. 
Foreign direct investment has played a wider role in promoting development in the cohesion 
countries than would be accounted for by its direct share of output in the economy. It has 
helped to bring in new skills and so to expand the human capital of the work force. For 
economies with little experience of trading in a wider European market, the management 
skills and the ready access to markets abroad which foreign investors bring has expanded the 
vision of business throughout the economies of the countries where they operate. This has 
been particularly important in Ireland, but it has also played an important role in Spain. 
Greece has proved to be a less attractive market for foreign direct investment than the other 
cohesion countries. 
Creating a competitive economy is not just about eliminating barriers to trade. It is also very 
important to tackle the barriers to competition within individual economies. The “Lisbon 
Agenda” was important long before its name was coined. In the case of each of the cohesion 
economies internal barriers to trade and efficiency were important factors in the relatively 
underdeveloped nature of their economies. The success or otherwise in tackling these 
problems has affected the speed with which these economies have converged to the EU 
average standard of living. 
4. The Labour Market 
The behaviour of the labour market has been of crucial importance in the process of 
convergence in each of the cohesion countries. Inflexibility in the labour markets of the 
different countries has posed obstacles for the convergence process. Too rapid a convergence 
in wage rates, with a resulting loss of competitiveness could slow or halt the convergence 
process, while a slow adjustment of wage rates to rising productivity levels could hasten 
convergence. The experience of the four cohesion economies, where market forces have 
played an important role in the speed of adjustment of wage rates, can be contrasted with that 
of East Germany where the convergence in wage rates was determined institutionally. 
Each of the cohesion countries has undergone a process of transition, including freeing of 
trade and EU membership, affecting both the demand for labour and the supply of labour. In 
the case of labour supply the role of trade unions has changed, with direct implications for the 
wage bargaining process itself. EU membership has also opened up the possibility of 
migration affecting labour supply. On the demand side, membership of the EU and the 
completion of the Single Market have changed the focus for many of the firms operating in 
these previously rather closed economies. Today firms producing tradable goods, and 
increasingly tradable services, are competing in a global market and this has important 
implications for the factors driving their demand for labour. 
The Irish labour market has a unique structure, having been so closely integrated with that of 
the UK in the past, and having a very elastic supply of labour through short-term migration. 
There are many similarities in the structure of the Iberian labour markets, such as relatively 
high levels of employment protection (see OECD, 1999), apparently similar architecture of 
wage bargaining, and comparable generosity of unemployment insurance systems since 1989 
(Bover et al., 2000). However, these similarities mask significantly different labour market 
outcomes, with Portugal enjoying one of the lowest unemployment rates in the EU (4.1% in 
2001) while Spain suffered the highest (13% in 2001).  
In looking at Ireland, Spain and Portugal we are considering three very different economies 
that have shown significant convergence towards the EU average standard of living over the 
last thirty years (see Fitz Gerald and Hore 2002 for a fuller discussion). All three have 
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undergone radical transformation in that period and all three have become members of the EU 
since 1970. This process of convergence has affected the process of wage determination. 
In a standard neo-classical model, if wage rates converge too rapidly towards the EU standard 
of living, then the incentive for firms to increase production in the converging economy will 
be reduced. This could slow, or even halt the process of convergence. On the other hand, if 
wage rates were to lag behind the convergence in living standards (measured in terms of 
output), then the enhanced profitability of firms could accelerate the convergence process. 
The rise in output and the rise in productivity will themselves affect the labour market through 
their effects on the demand for labour. EU membership and the broader process of EU 
integration could also be expected to affect the supply of labour through enhancing the 
opportunity for migration and, indirectly, through changing expectations and the regulation of 
the labour market. Thus the behaviour of the labour market can play a potentially important 
role in determining the speed and nature of the convergence process. 
Figure 4: Ireland - Wage and Output Convergence 
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Figure 5: Spain - Wage and Output Convergence 
GDP Relative to EU, Labour Costs Relative to France 
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Figure 4 shows Irish labour costs have moved relative to the UK over the 40 years from 1960 
to 2000.  Between 1960 and the mid-1970s Irish labour costs rose rapidly relative to the UK. 
However, from the late 1970s to today Irish labour costs have plateaued out, fluctuating 
around a level of 90 per cent of UK labour costs.  Since 1980 such changes as have occurred 
have arisen from changes in the exchange rate, with no obvious long-term trend in relative 
wage rates. This convergence in labour costs predates the convergence in living standards to 
the EU average, as shown in Figure 4.   
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Figure 5 shows the path of wage and output convergence in Spain since the mid-1960s. While 
less dramatic than in the case of Ireland, relatively steady progress is seen in the process of 
convergence over the full period. In the case of labour costs, they rose much more rapidly in 
Spain in the early 1990s than in other partner EU countries.  However, within a few years 
there was a major downward adjustment, such that labour costs in Spain fell back below 70 
per cent of the French level, while convergence in living standards continued. 
Figure 6: Portugal - Wage and Output Convergence 
GDP Relative to EU, Labour Costs Relative to France 
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As shown in Figure 6, since joining the EU in the mid-1980s Portugal has made fairly steady 
progress in terms of convergence in living standards towards the EU average. While still 
experiencing a significantly lower standard of living than the average, the gap has narrowed 
dramatically over the last fifteen years. Labour costs began the 1980s very much below labour 
costs elsewhere in the EU. They began to rise more rapidly than in France in the late 1980s, 
after the process of convergence in living standards had begun. Since then progress has 
continued over the 1990s. However, unlike the case of Spain and Ireland, they still remain 
very far below EU average levels. To some extent this reflects lower price levels in Portugal, 
so that the purchasing power of a given level of wages (in euros) is higher than in 
neighbouring countries. However, even allowing for this difference in prices, the figures still 
reflect the fact that the purchasing power of wage rates in Portugal remains well below that in 
the rest of the EU. 
Figure 7: Unemployment Rates 
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If the labour market cleared instantly then the explanation for the path of wage rates would be 
found through modelling labour demand and labour supply; the wage determination equation 
would just be a reduced form of the simple underlying structural model. However, as shown 
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in Figure 7, the path of unemployment in Spain and Ireland indicates that the labour market 
has been very slow to clear. In Portugal, by contrast, unemployment never rose above 9 per 
cent of the labour force and the labour market has shown more rapid adjustment to the state of 
the economic cycle.  
In the case of Ireland, unemployment rose rapidly in the early 1980s. While there was 
certainly evidence that it was affected by the state of the economic cycle, there was also 
extensive evidence of hysteresis. However, the late 1990s and the early years of this decade 
witnessed a phenomenal reduction in the unemployment rate, as the domestic economy 
boomed, resulting in a record rate of employment growth. The unemployment rate reached a 
historic low of 3.8% in 2001. 
For Spain, the pattern of the unemployment rate mirrored that in Ireland in the 1980s, with 
little evidence that the labour market cleared in the short term. However, the rate rose further 
in the early 1990’s, reaching a much higher level, and still remains high relative to the rest of 
the EU, even given a phase of rapid economic growth throughout the late 1990s. This 
contrasts sharply with the Portuguese unemployment rate, which has remained lower than 
most EU countries throughout the period under consideration. It seems that the explanation 
for such different performance lies in differing labour market institutions and wage 
adjustment processes between Spain and Portugal. Demand- or supply-side shocks are 
unlikely to hold the key to explaining the differing performances, as both Spain and Portugal 
have been exposed to similar shocks since the 1970’s. However, when different labour market 
institutions are exposed to similar shocks, this can lead to significantly different outcomes 
(Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000). 
Blanchard and Jimeno (1995) identify the unemployment benefit system as one of the key 
differences between the countries, with a generous system in operation in Spain whereas 
benefits were virtually non-existent in Portugal before 1986. Throughout the 1990’s 
replacement ratios and benefit coverage have converged between the two countries, although 
the system still remains more generous in Spain. Another similarity between the countries is 
the existence of minimum wage laws set each year, including collective bargaining 
agreements that set wage floors for the different occupation categories. However, these wage 
floors are set at a relatively lower level in Portugal, thus giving the employer more scope for 
manoeuvre. This results in actual wages exceeding the agreed minimum levels in Portugal (by 
about 10% for unskilled workers), but not in Spain (see Bover et al., 2000).    
These data suggest that the Portuguese labour market has been more flexible than that of 
Spain and Ireland, with wage rates adjusting to clear the labour market over a relatively short 
space of time. However, labour market reforms in Spain gradually reduced employment 
protection since the late 1980s (by narrowing the definition of an “unfair” dismissal) and also 
increased the number of workers on fixed term contracts, thus adding more flexibility to the 
system. Nevertheless, a more generous benefit system combined with less flexibility in wages 
helps to explain the large unemployment differential between Spain and Portugal.  
The data shown above for relative labour costs include both wage costs and social insurance 
contributions paid by employers. The after-tax wages received by individual workers are 
significantly different from the cost to employers, due to the operation of the tax (including 
social insurance) system. For employees what concerns them in the long run is the 
development of real after tax wage rates. For employers it is the cost of employing a unit of 
labour relative to the price they get for their output. The “wedge” between these two prices is 
accounted for by changes in tax rates and changes in output prices relative to consumer prices.  
The rise in tax rates, especially when the rise was quite rapid, may have had an impact on 
wage determination. The evidence in Drèze and Bean, 1990, using data for an earlier period, 
found that the tax wedge did not have a significant effect on wage determination in many of 
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the countries they considered. However, they did find a significant effect on Spanish wage 
rates (they did not consider Ireland). Anderton and Barrell (1995) did not find any long run 
effect of the tax wedge for Spain, but did find a significant effect for Ireland, consistent with 
Bradley and Fitz Gerald (Bradley et al., 1993). Fitz Gerald and Hore, 2002, using more recent 
data find a significant tax wedge effect for the three countries Ireland, Spain and Portugal. As 
a result, the rise in taxes to fund enhanced public services on joining the EU had a knock-on 
effect on domestic wage rates and labour cost competitiveness. 
The ratio of personal taxation to personal income for Ireland, Spain and Portugal rose fairly 
steadily up to the 1980s. In the case of Ireland it peaked in 1987 and fell back by 1990, 
remaining relatively unchanged thereafter. In the case of Spain it continued to increase until 
the early 1990s, showing some small reduction in 1995. In Portugal, while showing a fairly 
continuous increase over the thirty years, it grew particularly rapidly in the second half of the 
1980s. The effect of this rise in tax rates was to put upward pressure on wage rates, adversely 
affecting the competitiveness of these economies. 
The final factor that potentially affects labour supply in a global economy is migration and its 
related effect on employees’ expectations. While in a closed economy, labour is assumed to 
choose between employment in the domestic economy and leisure (unemployment), in an 
open economy migration presents a third possibility. In a fully integrated market, labour in 
one country or region can choose between the after tax wage rate available in the home 
country or region and the after tax wage rate in other countries or regions. Obviously there are 
costs to migration so that the rate of return in the foreign country must significantly exceed 
that in the home country to adequately reward migration. The broad process of European 
integration improves information on living standards in neighbouring countries (or regions), 
and this may give rise to pressures for similar conditions domestically, even if the costs of 
migration prevent the bulk of the labour force from moving. 
While in the case of Ireland, migration to the UK has been unrestricted for the last two 
centuries, the same was not true for emigration from Spain and Portugal. In the latter two 
countries full free movement of labour only became possible with EU entry in 1986. 
However, even with the possibility of free movement of labour after EU entry, Blanchard and 
Jimeno (1995) find that migration has not played a major role in balancing the labour markets 
in Spain and Portugal. While migration is not a major determinant of labour supply in Spain, 
there may be some role for migration in the wage determination process in Portugal. In 1999, 
over half a million Portuguese were living in France, representing 5% of the total Portuguese 
population. In 1982, there were over three-quarters of a million Portuguese living in France, 
almost 8% of the total population (see OECD, 2001). Although the number living in France 
has declined, the number living in Belgium, Germany and Luxembourg has doubled over the 
same period.  
A succession of papers highlights the importance for Ireland of substantial migration flows 
relative to the size of the labour force. These flows are driven by changes in both 
unemployment and wages relative to the UK (see Barrett, 1998, Kearney, 1998, and O’Grada 
and Walsh, 1994). While changes in unemployment may exert a negative effect on wage rates 
in the short run, emigration will reduce unemployment in the long run, eliminating any 
downward pressure on wage rates.  The converse will be true for falls in unemployment that 
will attract immigration.  
As discussed above, while migration has had a significant effect on wage determination in 
Ireland, this was not the case for Spain and the Portuguese case requires further investigation. 
However, it played a significant role in the post-unification German labour market and, with 
EU enlargement, there remains the possibility that it could play an important role in the 
convergence process for the new EU member states. 
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In addition to the factors considered above, a range of institutional factors might have affected 
wage determination in the three countries examined. In Ireland, the advent of what is referred 
to as the “partnership process”, beginning in 1987, introduced institutionalised wage 
bargaining between the government, employers and trade unions (Sexton and O’Connell, 
1996). The process involves an explicit trade off of tax-cuts for wage moderation. This 
arrangement has persisted up to and including the present.  
Unionisation may also have played a significant role in affecting the wage bargaining process, 
changing the shape of the supply curve of labour. The evidence suggests that for Ireland, 
union density did play a significant role (Curtis and Fitz Gerald, 1994). However, 
unionisation was itself endogenous, and it may have picked up other aspects of structural 
change occurring in the economy. In the case of Spain unions only became legal in 1977, 
which means that any effect that unionisation could have is limited to the post-1980 period. 
Nevertheless, Blanchard and Portugal (2001) mention differences in union power as a 
principal factor behind longer unemployment duration in Spain than other countries. 
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Figure 9: Relative Unskilled Wage Rates 
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The opening up of the cohesion economies as part of the EU integration process changed the 
factors that affect the price they are prepared to pay for their factor inputs, including the price 
of labour. To remain competitive they have to consider the global demand for their product 
and their competitiveness compared to foreign producers. 
In the case of labour supply, the potential to choose employment in different labour markets 
can directly affect expectations of individual workers. Even if the extent of migration is low, 
the potential for migration (the option value of a job abroad) affects wage expectations of 
individual employees. In turn this can affect the domestic supply of labour. 
The analysis in Fitz Gerald and Hore, 2002, shows that integration into the European Union 
has significantly affected the wage determination process in Ireland, Portugal and Spain. In 
each of these three countries there is evidence of a change in wage formation behaviour 
because of the process of EU integration. As a result, labour market conditions elsewhere in 
the EU now directly affect domestic wages in these cohesion economies. Ireland has the most 
open labour market, with a lower degree of openness for Spain and Portugal. This reflects the 
fact that Irish labour supply is much more sensitive to labour market conditions abroad 
through migration, than is the case for the other two countries. For all three countries the 
bargaining behaviour of firms was affected by the process of EU integration. 
The higher mobility of skilled labour within the EU could be expected to result in a narrower 
dispersion of skilled wage rates across the EU than for unskilled wage rates. Figures 8 and 9 
give estimates for the dispersion of skilled and unskilled wage rates across most of the 15 EU 
members in 2000.2 In the case of unskilled wage rates, the Portuguese and Spanish rates are 
around €5 and €8 an hour respectively whereas rates in Germany, the Netherlands and Finland 
are around €14 an hour – between twice and three times the Iberian rates. However, as shown 
in Figure 9, for skilled rates the German, Netherlands and Finish rates of around €25 an hour 
are less than twice the Portuguese and Spanish rates.  
For employers, because of the wedge represented by payroll taxes, the dispersion of skilled 
wage rates is even narrower than it is for employees, with the cost lying between €20 and €30 
an hour for most of the EU member states. 
The Figures also show estimated skilled and unskilled rates for Hungary and Poland. In the 
case of these two countries there is, not surprisingly, a very big gap between their wage rates 
and even those of the poorest EU countries. This applies to both skilled and unskilled rates. 
For the EU accession countries undergoing a fast-track accession process these results have 
important implications. The research that predicts major migration flows as a result of 
enlargement (Boeri and Brucker, 2000, and Sinn and Werding, 2001) fails to adequately take 
account of the likely impact of EU membership on the labour markets of the new members. 
The experience of Ireland, Portugal and Spain suggests that EU integration will cause wages 
to adjust upwards in the accession countries, as these economies begin the process of 
convergence. This will reduce the potential for migration flows, since the incentives to 
emigrate are much lower than a static model would suggest. This is what happened in 
Portugal when they joined the EU in 1986. However, the potential for migration may still be 
                                                     
2 A measure of skilled and unskilled wage rates by country for 2000 was obtained in the following 
manner. An index of human capital was first derived for each country. This was obtained by weighting 
the index of returns for each level of education by the proportion of those in employment in that 
educational category. Then average hourly wage rates (for employees) and labour costs (for employers) 
in euro were taken from the Eurostat Labour Cost Survey for 2000. The skilled rates are obtained by 
dividing the average wage rate for all labour by an index of human capital and multiplying by the index 
of returns for skilled labour. A similar method was used to obtain the measure of unskilled wage rates. 
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sufficient in the accession countries to have an appreciable impact on labour supply as people 
adjust their expectations to the advent of free movement of labour.  
A study of wage dispersion in Poland between 1988 and 1996 shows that skilled wage rates 
rose much more rapidly than unskilled over that period (Keane and Prasad, 2002). At the 
same time, we know from Boeri and Brucker, 2000, that the bulk of the significant emigration 
from Poland over that period was of skilled labour, substantially tightening domestic supply. 
Under these circumstances it is in no way surprising that skilled wage rates rose rapidly. If 
any of the forecasts for future emigration from these countries in Boeri and Brucker, 2000, 
and Sinn and Werding, 2001 were to be realised, there would be a further dramatic tightening 
of the labour markets for skilled labour in the origin countries. The evidence from Ireland in 
the late 1990s shows the potential importance of this mechanism in driving changes in skilled 
wage rates. In the Irish case the immigration of skilled labour resulted in a narrowing in wage 
dispersion and higher economic growth (Barrett, et al., 2002), the opposite of the potential 
effects of skilled emigration on the new EU members. 
Large scale emigration of skilled labour would set off a process driving rapid convergence in 
skilled wage rates between the new EU members and the existing member states. Even if 
many of the skilled emigrants initially work in unskilled employment in the destination 
countries the effect would still be to promote convergence between skilled wage rates in the 
origin countries and unskilled rates in the destination countries. As there are only around 15 
million people aged 20 to 34 in the new member states, emigration on the scale predicted 
could have very big labour market effects in the origin countries. 
5. Human Capital 
The importance of investment in human capital in promoting growth has long been 
recognised in economic theory. However, there remains considerable controversy about its 
practical significance in explaining differentials in realised growth rates. There are difficulties 
in measurement of the stock of human capital and there have been a wide range of 
comparative studies that have tried to quantify its role.  Nonetheless there is considerable 
evidence that it plays a very important role in promoting economic growth and hence in 
underpinning the process of economic convergence (de la Fuente and Ciccone, 2003). 
The investment in human capital can affect the economy through a number of different 
channels: it can increase the productivity of the work force; it can increase labour-force 
participation, especially by women; and it can reduce the numbers of unskilled at risk of 
unemployment. There is extensive data for EU countries showing the return to education for 
the individual. All of them indicate substantial private gains from education. For Portugal 
those with a third level education earn around 178% of what someone who has only 
completed their second level education. For Germany the figure is 145% and for Italy it is a 
low 127%.3  
While the returns to human capital for the individual may be substantial at a point in time, 
theoretically this might not be the case over time as the supply of skilled labour rises. There is 
the potential for “qualification inflation”, with the increase in the supply of skilled labour 
driving down the price. However, the evidence from a range of studies suggests that this is not 
necessarily the case. For the United Kingdom and the United States there is extensive 
evidence that the returns to education have, if anything, risen over time (Harmon, Walker and 
Westergaard-Nielsen, 2001). The evidence for Ireland indicates that the returns to education 
rose markedly between 1987 and 1997 and then fell back somewhat to 2000 with a shortage 
of unskilled labour and an elastic supply of skilled labour (Barrett, Fitz Gerald and Nolan, 
                                                     
3 These figures are taken from OECD, 2003, Education at a Glance. 
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2002). For Poland there was a dramatic increase in the returns to education between 1988 and 
1996 (Keane and Prasad, 2002). 
The differences in the stock of human capital, and more recent trends in investment in human 
capital, play a significant role in explaining differences in individual economic performance. 
In the immediate aftermath of the second world war many countries in Northern Europe 
invested heavily in the human capital of their young population. This investment in the 
immediate post-war years produced its maximum rate of return in countries such as Austria 
and Germany in the 1970s (Koman and Marin, 1997). The investment in human capital made 
forty years ago is reflected in the stock of human capital of the population aged 55 to 59 in 
those countries today. Thirty years ago there were major differences in the stock of human 
capital between the cohesion countries and the rest of Northern Europe. As shown in Figure 
10, for the existing EU 15, as well as for a number of states in Central Europe, around 80% of 
this cohort completed second level education. However, for Ireland, Spain, Portugal and 
Greece the situation was very different. In what can now be referred to as the “Cohesion” 
countries only 40% of those aged 55 to 59 today had the benefit of completing second level 
education. 
Figure 10: Educational Attainment of Population Aged 55-59 
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Figure 11: Educational Attainment of Population Aged 25-29 
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However, as shown in Figure 11, for 25-29 year olds the situation in the cohesion countries is 
very different today. In the case of both Ireland and Spain 40% of that cohort had completed 
third level education in 2002, which is above the EU average.  
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With the exception of Ireland and Greece, there was less progress in increasing the share of 
the population completing their high school education. For Spain almost 40% of the 
population aged 25-29 had not completed high school whereas for Portugal the figure was 
around 60%. 
Using these data on educational attainment as weights, it is possible to use the data on the 
returns to education to generate a human capital index for the 25-29 cohort and the 55-59 
cohort in a range of different countries. Figure 12 shows the ratio of the index for 25-29 year 
olds to that for 55-59 year olds, providing a measure of the investment in human capital over 
the last 30 years in the cohesion countries and a range of other EU and accession countries. 
This Figure shows that the index for countries like Germany, Denmark, Finland and Hungary, 
which already had good educational systems 30 years ago, increased little over time. 
However, for Greece, Spain, Portugal, Ireland, which all had relatively poor educational 
systems a generation ago, there has been considerable progress.4 Of the richer EU countries 
there has also been significant additional investment in education in Italy and the UK over the 
last 30 years. 
Figure 12: Investment in Human Capital 
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In spite of the major improvement in educational attainment, Portugal still has a low level of 
attainment as shown in Figure 8. The very high proportion of the population who have not 
completed high school in Portugal has serious implications for productivity and, therefore, for 
convergence in that economy. For Spain, while there has been major progress in the 
proportion of the population going on to third level, the proportion not completing high 
school is very high.  
De la Fuente and Ciccone, 2003, comment that the returns to additional education for those 
with a very low level of basic attainment are particularly high. A study by Breen and Shortall, 
1992, for Ireland, showed that upgrading the educational attainment of those leaving school 
with no qualifications to at least the most basic level of qualification would greatly reduce the 
level of unemployment, and of state expenditure on unemployment benefits. This suggests the 
possibility of significant further gains to investment in education in both Spain and Portugal. 
The evidence discussed in de la Fuente and Ciccone, 2003, shows that investment in human 
capital can play an important direct role in raising productivity and hence promoting 
convergence. It is clear from the data shown above that there has been a very significant 
upgrading of educational attainment in the cohesion countries over the last 30 years. This 
                                                     
4 Data on the returns to education are taken from OECD Education at a Glance. For Poland they are 
taken from Keane and Prasad, 2002 and for Greece from Tsakloglou and Cholezas, 2000. 
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investment in human capital is a very important factor in explaining the more rapid growth in 
productivity that has contributed to the convergence in living standards. 
Figure 13: Unemployment Rates by Educational Attainment, 25-29 year olds 
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In addition to its effects on enhancing productivity, investment in human capital also helps 
reduce unemployment by reducing the supply of unskilled labour by turning the unskilled into 
skilled workers. As shown in Figure 13, those with the lowest level of educational attainment 
have significantly higher rates of unemployment in Ireland and Spain (as in France Germany 
and the UK). While the Lisbon Agenda addresses the need to increase the number of unskilled 
jobs in the EU to address this problem, probably a more effective long-term solution is to 
reduce the supply of unskilled labour by investment in education. This approach is consistent 
with the evidence presented in de la Fuente and Ciccone, 2003.  
Finally, the investment in human capital also has the effect of raising female labour force 
participation. This is because the participation rate for women with third level education  is 
much higher than that for women who have completed high school. In turn, participation rates 
for women who have completed high school are higher than for those with very limited 
educational attainment. As discussed earlier, the rise in participation rates has played an 
important role in raising the growth in GDP per head in the cohesion countries. This is an 
additional channel through which investment in human capital has contributed to the 
convergence process. 
This analysis suggests that investment in human capital has played an important role in 
promoting convergence by the cohesion countries. For Portugal, in particular, the substantial 
investment to date still leaves that country with a relatively low stock of human capital. For 
many of the accession countries the stock of human capital is already quite high. However, 
the experience of the cohesion countries suggests that investment in human capital can play 
an important role in their convergence process. The dislocation involved in the transition 
process adversely affected the educational systems in some countries leaving room for further 
improvement. 
5. Development Policies  
While much attention is devoted in all member states to the budgetary process and the stance 
of fiscal policy, sensible fiscal policy cannot of itself raise the potential growth rate of an 
economy. It is only policy measures that impact on the supply side of the economy that can 
raise the potential growth rate. As discussed above, investment in human capital has an 
important role to play in raising the productive potential of the accession countries. In 
addition, the wide range of public policy measures covered by the Lisbon Agenda, which help 
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promote a competitive economy can play a vital role in making economies more flexible and 
competitive (Sapir, 2003). In many cases these policies, when considered individually, may 
appear unexciting and unimportant. However, their cumulative impact can make the 
difference between convergence and divergence. 
Many studies have considered the importance of investment in physical infrastructure in 
promoting growth. The conclusion of these studies is that, like a child who has outgrown her 
clothes, a shortage of physical infrastructure can constrain an economy. However, “too much” 
infrastructure cannot add to the growth potential of an economy, and could burden a country 
with unsustainable debts. 
It is difficult to measure the stock of public infrastructure. However, there is evidence that a 
shortage of physical infrastructure has constrained economies from catching up. For example, 
ESRI, 2003, shows that for Ireland the shortage of infrastructure was a particularly serious 
constraint on growth in 2000, having been largely adequate to the economy’s needs in the 
early 1980s. 
Figure 14: Investment as a share of GDP, 2001 
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Figure 15: Public Investment as % of GDP 
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Note: For Ireland investment is expressed as a % of GNP. 
Figure 14 shows that the level of investment in the cohesion countries is roughly five 
percentage points of GDP higher than in the richer EU economies. This reflects the deficit in 
infrastructure public and private (housing) in these economies. For each of these economies 
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the need to devote such a high share of income to investment means that their level of 
consumption is reduced. As a result, for consumers the rise in living standards has been 
slower than is suggested by the convergence in GDP per head. 
In addition, as shown in Figure 15, Ireland, Spain and Portugal have a substantially higher 
level of public investment, financed partly by the EU CSF and partly by domestic tax 
revenues. In the case of the existing EU the major investment in infrastructure in the 1950s 
and 1960s was partly financed by borrowing. However, under the Stability and Growth Pact 
(SGP) this is not permitted today for the cohesion countries. However, the significant 
transfers under the EU CSF partly offset this constraint. 
For the accession countries there is likely to be a continuing need for infrastructural 
investment over the coming two decades. If the rates of return from such investment are as 
high as suggested in the studies discussed below, some limited borrowing might be justified 
to finance it. However, this is not possible under the SGP. Instead, the EU CSF will help relax 
this constraint, permitting a more rapid deployment of necessary investment. 
Figure 16: Number of Adults per Independent Household 
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Table 1: Number of dwellings completed per thousand population 
Country 1992-3 2000-3
Denmark 3.1 3.0 
Finland 7.3 5.9 
Greece 8.3 8.5 
Ireland 6.3 17.3 
Netherlands 6.0 4.1 
Poland 3.5 2.7 
Portugal 5.6 10.3 
Spain 3.3 10.2 
United Kingdom 3.3 3.1 
United States 4.5 6.1 
Source: United Nations Economic Commission for Europe. UK -  UK ONS. US - US Census Bureau 
New Residential Construction. Spanish data for 1993, all others 1992. Irish data for 2003, Netherlands, 
Spain, UK and US data for 2002. Greece data for 2000. Rest data for 2001. 
In addition to the need to provide public infrastructure there is a significant gap in the stock of 
private infrastructure in the form of dwellings in many of the new member states. Figure 16 
shows the number of adults per independent household for a range of EU countries. It shows a 
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fairly clear pattern where countries with an ageing population, which have had a high standard 
of living for a sustained period, have a relatively low number of adults per independent 
household. Typically countries such as Germany, the UK and France have less than 1.8 adults 
per household. For countries where the population is still relatively young (Ireland, Spain, and 
Portugal), with relatively few dwellings being released by the oldest age cohorts, there are 
significantly more adults per dwelling. In addition, where countries have a standard of living 
well below the EU average (Slovenia and Poland) they have a very much lower endowment of 
dwellings relative to the adult population.  
For those countries where living standards have shown significant convergence to the EU 
standard of living (Ireland, Portugal and Spain) the relatively high number of adults per 
dwelling, combined with increased real incomes could be expected to result in a major 
increase in investment in dwellings by the household sector.5 It will take many years of high 
investment to reduce the number of adults per household in the new member states to close to 
the rate in the more developed EU members.  
The effect of EMU has been to reduce the cost of borrowing for households, increasing the 
optimal stock of dwellings. Previously households were constrained from rapidly adjusting 
this stock through investment because of the high and uncertain cost of capital. Even though 
incomes rose fairly steadily over the last fifteen years it was only with the advent of EMU that 
there has been a boom in the building of dwellings in Spain, Portugal, and Ireland (Table 1). 
While this boom is not purely attributable to EMU, the advent of EMU has brought about a 
substantial fall in real interest rates for households through the reduction in the risk premium 
(Sinn, 2000). This reduction in real interest rates was particularly important for households as 
while many larger businesses could fund their investment through borrowing in DMs or 
dollars, benefiting from the lower real rates, this was not possible for households.6   
In addition to the reduction in real interest rates there was also more variance in the domestic 
interest rates of the cohesion countries before EMU. Households in those countries now face a 
more certain environment in which to borrow, one where interest rates are unlikely ever to 
reach the heights experienced in 1992/3. This greatly reduces the risks for households in 
borrowing to finance investment in dwellings. 
The shortage of dwellings in many of the new EU member states, and the problems with the 
quality of much of the existing stock, means that there is likely to be a need for major 
investment by households in dwellings as incomes rise. However, the timing of this 
investment may be affected by when each of these countries joins EMU. The reduction in real 
interest rates, consequent on EMU membership, could have significant positive effects on 
aggregate investment in these new members (Barrell, Holland and Pomerantz, 2004). This 
could be especially true for investment in dwellings and it may pose issues for each of these 
new members concerning how best to manage their housing market.   
6. The EU Structural Funds 
A range of different studies have looked at the impact of the EU CSF process on the 
economies of the cohesion countries. Some of these studies have produced quite negative 
results. These studies with rather negative results have tended to use simple single equation 
models which relate output to the investment funded under the CSF (Boldrin and Canova, 
                                                     
5 This assumes that preferences on household formation are similar across EU members. Differences in 
demographics and family structure could mean that, even with an identical cost of housing and 
identical incomes, the optimal stock of dwellings could differ. 
6 There was no legal restriction but effectively domestic banks were only prepared to lend on 
mortgages to households in domestic currency. 
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2003 and Ederveen, Gorter, Mooij, Nahuis, 2002). However, they have generally taken little 
account of the fact that the CSF interventions are small in magnitude relative to what is going 
on elsewhere in the economy. They have failed to take account of the range of other 
developments and, as de la Fuente, 2003b, points out, it is not surprising that they have come 
to a rather negative conclusion. 
There are a range of other studies based on more sophisticated models that have identified a 
significant positive impact from the EU CSF on the cohesion countries. Boeri, 2002, and 
Bradley et al., 2003, summarise a substantial number of studies of the accession countries 
undertaken using the HERMIN model (Bradley et al., 1995). Table 2 summarises these results 
from HERMIN for the second CSF period, 1994-1999, using two different measures of the 
long-term impact of the CSF. In the multiplier measure the cumulative impact on GDP over a 
fifteen-year period is divided by the total expenditure under the CSF. This shows a very 
substantial payback for Ireland and Portugal, as well as a favourable result for Spain. The 
second measure is a “rate of return” where the permanent increase in GDP is measured 
relative to the cumulated expenditure under the CSF. This measure underestimates the rate of 
return because it takes no account of the very substantial, but temporary, demand side effects 
as the CSF money is spent. 
Table 2: Measures of the Impact of CSF expenditure 
Impact of CSF 1994-2010, Bradley et al. 2003 
Greece Ireland Portugal Spain 
Cumulative Multiplier 
1.07 2.83 2.55 1.77 
Crude Rate of Return: 
3.67 10.47 11.37 8.13 
Impact of CSF: 2000-2002, Fitz Gerald  et al. 2003
Cumulative Multiplier 
 3.0   
Crude Rate of Return: 
 18.0   
Table 2 also shows the estimated impact of the CSF in Ireland for the first years of the current 
planning period. This study (ESRI, 2003) benefited from a range of microeconomic evidence 
permitting a more precise quantification of the effects of the CSF within the model context. It 
suggested a rather similar result to that found in previous studies using the HERMIN model.  
A rather different model-based approach in a study be de la Fuente, 2003b, has also produced 
an estimate of the impact of the CSF for the 1994-99 period for Spain. This study would 
suggest an even higher impact than the measures shown in Table 2. 
While there remains considerable uncertainty about the precise quantification of the benefits 
of the CSF funded investment, these studies indicate substantial economic rates of return for 
Spain, Ireland and Portugal. However, the magnitude of the CSF interventions is relatively 
small relative to the size of these economies. In the 1994-99 period the CSF expenditure 
ranged from under 1.5% of GDP in Spain to something over 4% in Greece (Bradley et al., 
2003). In addition, the supply-side benefits of the investment will take some considerable 
time to mature. Thus even with substantial rates of return, the CSF interventions only account 
for a minority of the convergence in output per head achieved by Ireland, Spain and Portugal 
over the 1990s. 
Figure 17 shows how the four cohesion countries used the EU CSF funding over the course of 
the 1990s. Spain and Greece devoted a particularly high share to financing investment in 
physical infrastructure, while Ireland concentrated more on human capital. Portugal devoted a 
particularly high share to aids to the private sector with Ireland in second place on this count. 
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The recent Mid-Term Evaluation of the CSF for Ireland, ESRI, 2003, suggested a high rate of 
return on investment in human capital and in physical infrastructure. However, it suggested 
that there was a generally lower rate of return on aids to the private sector, with the exception 
of support for R&D. This reflected the limited evidence of continuing market failure which 
would justify such aid. As a result, it was recommended that funding be redirected to human 
capital and physical infrastructure. With the winding down of CSF support for Ireland this 
recommendation primarily affects the allocation of Irish tax payers funds. 
Figure 17: Allocation of EU CSF 
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The evidence from successive evaluations of the Irish CSF, and also the experience with the 
CSF in the other cohesion countries, would suggest that future CSF finance for the accession 
countries may produce greater long-term benefit if it is concentrated on investment in human 
capital and physical infrastructure. However, the experience of the cohesion countries also 
indicates that each country’s economy has different needs and there is not a simple formula 
for deciding on national investment priorities. 
At least as important as the direct funding provided by the EU has been the effect of the CSF 
process in introducing an improved methodology for undertaking public investment (Fitz 
Gerald, 1998). The increase in funding under the EU CSF encouraged the government to raise 
public investment from its low level in the late 1980s. This was particularly important for 
Ireland as it emerged from the fiscal crisis of the 1980s. While domestic policy makers lacked 
faith in the future growth potential of the economy, the ready availability of EU funds 
leveraged a bigger increase in public investment than would otherwise have occurred. 
Without such a stimulus Ireland could have found itself suffering from underinvestment in the 
face of rapid growth in recent years. As such it had a positive influence on the overall stance 
of public policy.  
The CSF process has also encouraged the introduction of effective long-term planning of 
public investment in the cohesion countries. It is also encouraging such a development in the 
accession countries, even before membership. In the past, investment projects stopped and 
started in line with short-term economic pressures on governments, resulting in significant 
waste of resources. Now the formulation of a national development plan and its subsequent 
implementation without major interruption leads to a more rational allocation of resources. In 
addition, the need to satisfy the donor countries, through the EU Commission, that their 
money is well spent has resulted in the introduction of a set of evaluation procedures which 
has helped change the way the administration approaches public expenditure. In the past the 
only question, once money had been voted by parliament, was whether it had been spent in 
accordance with regulations. Now there is increasing interest in assessing how effective the 
expenditure has been. In many cases these evaluations have been published and, while not 
always listened to, they have had a significant influence on policy. 
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The programme approach to public investment has also tended to focus attention on particular 
policy problems, making public servants involved in the planning process consider the wider 
implications of individual measures. For example, each of the so-called operational 
programmes under the CSF has its own monitoring committee consisting of relevant public 
servants, representatives of the EU Commission, some representatives of outside interests 
and, in the case of the major programmes, an independent evaluator reporting to the 
committee rather than to the government. While ultimate responsibility for spending decisions 
really rests with the national governments, the involvement of the EU Commission officials 
has helped nudge domestic decision makers towards measures which are desirable on 
economic criteria. The long-term involvement of key EU officials in the process also helps 
provide continuity in decision making. 
7. Conclusions 
The process of EU integration on its own has played an important role in promoting 
convergence between the four existing cohesion countries, Ireland, Spain, Portugal and 
Greece, and the EU average level of output per head. In the case of Ireland and Portugal the 
higher rate of growth in productivity has been particularly important in bringing about 
convergence. This has implications for the accession countries: it is important to concentrate 
on policies that will enhance the growth of productivity in the longer term. However, another 
important factor in the convergence process was the fall in age dependency. This is not a 
factor that can be repeated elsewhere. 
The way the labour market interacts with the convergence process is important. If wage rates 
converge to the EU standard of living more rapidly than the rate of productivity, then the 
convergence process will be interrupted or halted. This suggests the importance of developing 
flexible labour markets in the accession countries. In addition, because increases in the tax 
wedge affecting earnings tends to impact on wage formation, an unduly rapid rise in the 
standard of public services (and hence taxation) could also adversely impact on the 
convergence process. This was the case in Ireland in the 1980s. It is important that the 
requirements of accession do not push the accession countries into raising their expenditure 
on public services more rapidly than their economies can sustain. 
The rate of increase in investment in human capital has been higher in the cohesion countries 
over the last thirty years than in the rest of the EU. This has been an important factor driving 
the higher rate of productivity growth in these countries. This reflects the fact that these 
countries had been slow to appreciate the importance of investment in human capital in the 
1950s and 1960s and had a major deficit to make up. Even with this investment Portugal still 
displays a significantly lower stock of human capital than the rest of the EU. While over the 
last 30 years the accession countries generally had educational systems comparable to those in 
Western Europe, rather than in the cohesion countries, there is a continuing need to invest in 
them. 
A major factor underlying the high rate of unemployment in the EU and in the accession 
states is the size of the unskilled labour force relative to demand for unskilled labour. In a 
global economy the demand for skilled labour is rising rapidly. Unless economies raise the 
average educational attainment of their labour force in line with the growth in demand for 
skilled labour, there will either be high levels of unskilled unemployment or else an increase 
in the dispersion of wage rates. While policy can attempt to stimulate the demand for 
unskilled labour, it is probably more sustainable to invest through the educational system in 
turning the unskilled labour of the future into skilled labour. This would greatly enhance the 
labour force prospects of those involved, increasing welfare, and could significantly reduce 
future unemployment transfers. 
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The stock of physical infrastructure in the cohesion countries is still significantly lower than 
in the rest of the EU. The shortage of physical infrastructure is a significant constraint on 
future growth and convergence. As a result, the level of both private and public investment in 
these countries is significantly higher than in the rest of the EU. This greater concentration on 
investment means that relative consumption levels in the cohesion countries lag further 
behind the rest of the EU than is the case for output. It will only be when the stock of 
infrastructure in these countries has reached an acceptable level, probably some time in the 
next decade, that convergence in living standards can be complete. The EU CSF payments 
have played a significant role in reconciling this greater need to invest with the constraints on 
borrowing under the Stability and Growth Pact. 
The accession countries have similar needs for accelerated investment and will benefit by a 
continuation of the EU support for cohesion. The substantial returns to infrastructure 
investment in the cohesion countries, when properly managed, suggests a significant payback 
to such investment in the accession countries. Each country will have to determine its own 
priorities for public investment. There is a danger that the key role of human capital may be 
undervalued in planning future investment. In addition, the experience of the CSF in Ireland 
suggests that less emphasis should be put on direct aid to the private sector and a higher 
proportion of the available resources should be devoted to investment in physical 
infrastructure and human capital. 
Finally, experience in the cohesion countries suggests that the structural funds process brings 
administrative benefits over and above the direct financial aid. Its emphasis on medium-term 
planning, consistency between different forms of investment, and evaluation of results can 
benefit the process of public investment, not just where that investment is funded as part of 
the EU CSF, but also where it is funded out of domestic taxation. 
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